A Background Report: School Aid Goals, Parameters, Formulas and Impacts Under Declining Enrollment by Edelman, Dr. Mark A. & Knudsen, James J.
Economic Staff Paper Series Economics
6-1988
A Background Report: School Aid Goals,
Parameters, Formulas and Impacts Under
Declining Enrollment
Dr. Mark A. Edelman
Iowa State University, medelman@iastate.edu
James J. Knudsen
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Education Law Commons, Political Economy
Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economic Staff Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edelman, Dr. Mark A. and Knudsen, James J., "A Background Report: School Aid Goals, Parameters, Formulas and Impacts Under
Declining Enrollment" (1988). Economic Staff Paper Series. 217.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/217
A Background Report: School Aid Goals, Parameters, Formulas and
Impacts Under Declining Enrollment
Abstract
There is no such thing as a perfect state school aid formula. Different people define equal educational
opportunity differently and school aid formulas include a variety of criteria and incentives that result from
compromise and majority voting after being "hammered out" through the political process.
Disciplines
Administrative Law | Education Law | Political Economy | State and Local Government Law
This report is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/217
Staff Paper 188
A BACKGROUND REPORT:
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DISCUSSION OUTLINES
A. Political Constraints.
B. Philosophical and Judicial .Constraints*
-Equal access to school.
-Equal' education finance resources.. c
-Equal educational inputs.
—Equal educational'Outputs. •
Cm Fiscal Parameters and Constraints.
-How much from each source of revenue,?
-What ratio of state / local revenue?
...-What should, be minimum standards for funding?
-Which costs should be in the formula and which outside?
-How much fiscal equalization vs. local leeway is desirable?
D. School Formula Options and Consequences for Declining Pupils.
-Matching grants.
-Flat grants.
-Minimum Expenditure Guarantee. . v . : .
-Minimum Wealth Guarantee.
-Percentage Equalizing. ... ,
-Power Equalizing.
* This review of literature was requested by the Interim School
Finance Study- Committee of the Iowa Legislature. It ;was
presented to the Study Committee in testimony at the State
Capitoly . Des Mbinesy Iowa, June. 54» 1988.
**- Dr. Mark'A. Edelmanis an Associate Professor andExtension
Public Policy Economist, Department of Economics, Iowa State
University. James J..Knudsen'is a Graduate Research Assistant
who assisted Dr. Edelman. Dr.: Edelman was requested to serve as
a consultant to the Iowa Department of Education and.the Interim
School Finance Study Committee of the Iowa Legislature.
A BACKGROUND REPORTS
SCHOOL AID GOALS, PARAMETERS, FORMULAS
AND IMPACTS UNDER DECLINING ENROLLMENT
There is no such thing as a perfect state school aid
formula. Different people define equal educational opportunity
differently and school aid formulas include a variety of criteria
and incentives that result from compromise and majority voting
after being "hammered out" through the political process.
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
Any attempt to revise a state school aid formula Mill not
likely succeed unless most of the school districts receive more
aid under the new formula than under the old. Regardless of how
pure'p fair or sophisticated a proposed formula may be, it must
still pass the test of a majority vote. Thereforep.' major
revisions in state school aid are usually associated with
significant increases in the amount of revenue distributed. Mhen
school aid is significantly increased, more districts will likely
receive increases in state aid (Alexander, Mueller and Salmon).
"Hold harmless" provisions are often used "to "save from
harm" or to "grandfather" in current aid levels so that certain
districts will not receive less aid under the new formula. While
such hold harmless provisions may temporarily prevent, or slow the
impact of - reductions in aid^ they almost never provide - the
potential promise of increased aid for the districts affected
under a new formula- As a result, the affected' districts may
view hold harmless provisions as a second best solution compared
to continuing the present formula or to significant increases in
total state funding. .. But then, passage of a new school aid
f
formula only takes .a majority/ Vote,j not ,.a consensus. . of all
legislators', or all districts.
PHILOSOPHICAL AND JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS
Equalization of educational opportunity means different
things to different people. Different state constitutions and
courts provide additional interpretations and constraints on
state aid distributions. How do we provide for equal educational
opportunity for people with 'different.circumstances and values?
Because this question has.no easy answers^ it is appropriate for
our discussion-to clarify the implications of various definitions
of educational equality •<6armSy 'Giithrie'p and Pierce, ch S).-
Which of the definitions ought'~to be' applied .to provide
equal educational opportunity for Iowa school children?.
1. Each Duoil ought to have equal access to a school, This
means state aid pays for transportation and/or assures existence
of an'organized school. .Uhile this.may have.been the original
definition .used in the-homestead settlement days when many state
constitutions' were written^- most state supreme courts today have
become more restrictive in their judgements. ..
S. Each pupi1 ought to ^ guaranteed access to a school with
minimum standards. This definition means state aid is
distributed to districts so as to assure that minimum school
standards (course offerings, minimum pupils, teacher
qualifications and/or financial resources) are met. Beyond
minimum standards, local leeway depends on state limitations and
local district's aspirations and ability to pay.
3"" Each pupil ought ta-fes guaranteed equal access ' to
education finance resources. This means state aid is distributed
to districts so as to assure that wealth and/or expenditures per
unit are equalized within certain ranges across districts. Not
only are mandatory levies equalized, but local leeway is
equalized as well.
Each pupil ought .to: have equal - access to educational
inputs. This means that school expenditures per pupil, are allowed
to vary across districts due to specified, differences in labor
markets, input cost variations, ate. (differences in competitive
wages, teacher training, and/or years of. experience)- However,
variation in expenditures per pupil due to other differences,
such as variations in available wealth per pupil, are- not
legally allowed by law. Therefore, any potential local leeway
is equalized as well, in terms of wealth available per pupil-
. S. Each pupi1 ought to achieve eoual educational output or
performance. This definition means state aid is distributed to
equalize the. ability of students with different talents and
aptitudes to achieve minimum competency . and/or relative
competency. Special needs are recognized by distributing aid to
develop programs for pupils with learning disabilities and/or
gifted abilities. Such state aid incentives and/or penalties may
hinge on whether the perceived responsibility for the deficient
performance rests with the state, local district or parents.
In- summary, some of the above goals of equal educational
opportunity may result in similar consequences under special
circumstances. However, under most circumstances, each of the
equality goals., typically have consequences - that are quite
different. Finally, some states will.apply a combination of
these concepts.
FISCAL PARAMETERS AND CONSTRAINTS
In addition to determining the desired definition for equal
educational opportunityp decision-makers in each state must
also determine the policy parameters that are to be used to limit
or specify the nature and scope of the education equality
definition selected. The parameters chosen depend upon the
goalsy criteria, incentives, and/or results desired (Alexander,
Mueller, and Salman).
1• How • much of each source of revenue should be used to
finance educationTv The major sources of state-and local revenues
for . overhauling education finances are property, sales, income.
The other, current sources of revenue are not-productive enough to
finance a major portion , of the statewide -education cost.
However, they may provide a tune~up.
2- What should be the targeted ratio of state and local
revenues? Shifting the ratio.toward local sources of revenue
would tend ^to result in the-following consequences (Kohlmeyer).
More tax money would be raised locally. Local taxpayers would
only have to pay for local programs. Control rests with local
officials and taxpayers. Odds are that local property taxes would
be raised. Historical experience suggests that fewer school
consolidations are likely to occur. There would likely be wider
variation in educational opportunities provided.
Dn tha othar handy mhifting th« education finance ratio
toward state sources of revenue would tend to result in the
following consequences <Kohlmeyer>• Taxes paid by local
taxpayers would bear less relationship to local spending per
pupil or the local educational opportunity provided. Local
officials and taxpayers would likely have less to say about what
was done in their particular school. Odds are that less of the
school funding would come from local property taxes. Other local
property taxing units would likely be given more elbow room to
raise more revenue without raising total local property tax
revenue. More school consolidation would likely occur. Local
school programs would likely be standardized and made uniform.
In summary^ the "revised golden rule" is: "Those with the
gold—rule." Across the SO statesp state expenditures typically
range between 30 to. 70 percent of total school co'stsy except for
Hawaii at 100 percent from the state (NEA). -The average is about
half from state and half from local- In Iowa, nearly two-^thirds
of the school bill comes from state revenue sources. '
3.' What is the minimum adequate educational program that
should be 'funded- by the,formula? Should a high school have , at
least 60" kids and/or 41 coursB units to receive state aid.?'
. Which cost categories should fee in the equalization
formula and which cost categories should, be outside? For
example, should transportation and/br other functions be outside
the aid formula and should th® state or local district pay the
full or a matching share of these categories? Should
restructuring incentivas, performance pay be used in allocating
'resources, and shpuld they be in or outside;, the. general. formula?
.Should , special " ^education /prpgramsy, .[-.mandated - programs, -or
innovation and .professional development grants be inside or
outside the formula?, •
5- How much fiscal equalization is desirable? Mhat should be
the allowable variation in revenues and/or expenditures per
pupil/or unit? For what reasons should variation in expenditures
per pupil be allowed to exist across districts? For example^
should expenditure variations be allowed due to differences in
current or previous district wealth per pupil; differences in
labor market, energy, or construction conditions; and/or
differences in training and experiences of teachers employed.
'6. Should local (expenditures be allowed to vary. depending
upon - the aspirationsr of local decision^makers? , . Should local
leeway be allowed .on specific functions such j-as -capital projects,
buildings, .equipmant,: extracurricular programs? Should local
leeway be allowed to vary by district wealth or .-.the relative
wealth, during, an arbitrarily selected.base year?-
7- What special educational needs deserve additional
resources to assure equal access to educational opportunity?
Should special support and weighting be provided for handicapped,
special education, vocational education, performing arts, gifted
programs, sports, extracurricular needs and/or sex, drug abuse,
and aids education?
.S». What methods and-variables should bemused to- chart.. the
progress ijn achieving the desired limitations on variation in
educational bpportunitv? A scorecard for equality in taxation
might test whether revenues are'collected according to acceptable
*
measures of ability to pay-and whether those in like positions
I
are treated in a similar manner. On the other hand, a scorecard
for distributional'^ equity might test whether students have equal
access to resources for those with equal need and whether those
who have greater, needs in terms of educational inputs receive
greater access to resources than those who have less need as
defined by policymakers*
SCHOOL AID FORMULA OPTIONS AND
CONSEQUENCES UNDER DECLINING ENROLLMENT
After the policy parameters and constraints have been
determined, there are at least six basic types of formulas that
are used to distribute school aida Each -type of formula has
different implications depending upon the size and wealth of. the
district: Also the consequences under declining enrollment
scenarios vary among the aid formula options (Garmsp Guthr-iej and
Pierce^ ch 85 Alexander, Mueller, and Salmon).
For each of the options an illustration is used to show the
consequencBS by district wealth and for declining enrollments-
In all cases, it is assumed that valuation per pupil rises as
enrollment declines. This means that a specific school district
would move toward the right In all of the illustrations, assuming
other things constant.
The option or combination selected may depend in part upon
the equality definition selected, the policy parameters selected
and the desired distributional consequences of.the formula.
e
(1) Matching Brant, Compared to the other options^ the
matching grant results in the widest variation in expenditures
per pupil betweeh wealthy and poor districts (Figure 1). This
approach increases the variation in local leeway across
districts compared to the absence of a state aid ' program. The
percentage matching grant also tends to increase the variation in
expenditures per pupil across the school districts rather than
reduce this variation. Finally this approach- would likely
increase the variation in property tax fates across school
districts in the state.
1
While no state uses a matching grant for its general state
aid formuldp some states do use it for certain categorical grants
outside' of the foundation formula. The matching grant simply
' • • t
guarantees the state will specify a certain percentage match of
local revenues raised. For example^ some states will simply
share transportation expenditures on a 50-50 basis. Under this
option^ as enrollment declines^ valuation per pupil rises" leading
to higher/per pupil expenditures^ state aid and local effort.
(g) Equal Flat Brants. A flat grant guarantees a specified
amount , pf> aid per pupil (Figure 8). While no state currently
relies completely on a system of flat grants, several states use
this option in combination with others^ It can be argued that
the flat grant distribution reduces the variation in expenditures
' ' ' ' '' ' ,' / . ' " '
per pupil compared to a system of' total local leeway. However,
if the flat, grant is not sufficient to cover the total cost per
pupilfor the "poor" districts, then the variation in expenditures
per pupil would typically be greater than .the. other^ options,
Expend.
(thou $)
Variation in Scliool Spending
Across Districts, Option I:
Matciiing Grants
Per Pupil
600
Valuation / Pupil (thou $)
Local Effort State Aid
Figure 1. Matching Grant at 50-50;
Local Levy Limit at $10/1000.
Expend.
(thou $)
Variation in School Spending
Across Pistricts
Option II: Flat Grant
Per Pupil
^ 500
Valuation / Pupil (thou $)
•i State.Aid;- ^
Figure 2. Flat Grant ar$100b per-Pupil;
Local,Levy Rate Limit at $10/1000, ,
Local Leeway
except the matching grant. A graduated flat grant could be used
to reduce this variation.
As enrollment declines under the "flat grant program,
valuation per pupil rises leading to increased per pupil
expenditures and local effort. However under this option state
aid per pupil remains constant as valuation^per pupil rises.
(3) Foundation Minimum Expenditure Guarantee. Iowa and 30
other states (School Finance at a Glance) presently uses the
minimum expenditure guarantee concept (Figure 3). The state
establishes a guaranteed expenditure level per pupil. Local
districts are required to meet a specified level of local effort
(or charge-back), normally a uniform property tax levy rate
applied per $1,000 of valuation. The difference between the
guaranteed^ expenditure level per pupil and the required local
i ,
effort per pupil is provided by state aid. Expenditures' above the
guarantee level are at local discretion.
Under this approach, districts with greater ability to pay
in terms of assessed valuation per pupil normally receive less
state aid per pupil than districts with less valuation per pupil-
Therefore, the expenditure guarantee formula normally reduces the
variation in per pupil expenditures among districts compared to a
flat grant program.
Furthermore, if local leeway is removed by imposing higher
levels of required local effort, a relatively uniform property
tax rate is established across all districts in the state. As a
result, state required school property taxes on one parcel would
be similar to other equally valued parcels in other districts-
le
Variation in School Spending
Across Districts, Option III:
Minimum Expenditure Guarantee
Per Pupil
Expend.
600
Valuation /.Pupil, (thou $)
Req Effort State Aid Local Leeway
Figure 3. Required Levy Rate $5.40/1000
Minimum Expenditure Guarantee at $3000;
Local Levy Rate Lirnit at, $10/1000.
On the other handy as required local effort is reduced to
zerop the minimuni expenditure guarantee program becomes more like
a flat grant and variation in expenditures per pupil increase.
If there is declining enrollment^ valuation per pupil rises
resulting in increased per pupil expendituresp local leeway and
required local effort* Howeverp not only does total state aid
decline but state aid per pupil also declines as pupils decline.
(^} Minimum Wealth Guarantee. Currently, six. states use
this approach (School Finance at a Glance). Under this option,
the state guarantees that each district has more than a minimum
state selected level of valuation per pupil. Under the wealth
guarantee option, the actual local levy rate is used in place of
a. state selected property tax rate.
A variation of this approach is called the minimum tax
yield, which also guarantees a minimum levy rate in addition to
the valuation per pupil (Figure 4). Under this option, state aid
equals the fixed tax rate times the difference between the
guaranteed valuation level per pupil and a local district's
actual valuation per pupil, if it is lower.
If the state guarantee tax yield level is selected to be
above the district with the highest valuation per pupil in the
state, then state aid would be given to all districts and the aid
would be sufficient to equalize district wealth with the
wealthiest school district in the state. Expenditures above the
guarantee level would be at local discretion.
However, if the guarantee level is selected to be the - state
average valuation per pupil (Figure ^), only districts below the
Expend.
Variation in Sclnooi Spending
Across Districts, Option IV:
Minimum Tax Yield Guarantee
Per Pupil "
(thou $)
Valuation / Pupil (thou $)
Local Leeway
Figure 4. Tax Yield Guarantee at $3000
per Pupil; Local Levy Rate. Limit at $10. .. .
State Aid
500
state average would receive state aidp while districts exceeding
the state average would receive no state aid.
The aid for the "poor" districts would only be sufficient to
equalize wealth with the average valuation per pupil in the
state. At the same tiflie, those districts above the state
average valuation per pupil would have the'capacity to spend more
than the state average per pupil.
Property tax rates for parcels of property in poor districts
below the state guarantee level would tend to be uniform across
the poor districts. However, property tax rates for similar
parcels located in the rich districts above the • state average
valuation may vary according to local discretion.
If the wealth guarantee option is used local leeway is open-
ended because actual local tax rates are used in place of a state
selected tax rates. Under this variation^ the state aid for
districts below the guarantee would increase as local levy rates
increase. Dh the other hand, state aid for districts below the
guarantee would also decline, if local levy rates decline.
Under declining enrollment, rising valuation per pupil leads
to an increase in local effort and a decline in state, aid for
poor districts formerly receiving state aid. For rich districts
which did not receive state, expenditures are totally financed by
local revenues.
(3) Percentaoe Eaualizino. Four states use this approach
(School Finance at a Glance). The percentage equalizing formula
typically reduces the variation in expenditures per pupil more
than the previous formulas discussed (Figure 5). The percentage
16
Variation in School Spending
Across Districts, Option V;
Percentage Equalizing
Per Pupil
UMIltf.
(thou $)
Valuation / Pupil (thou $)
PH Local Leeway
Figure 5. State Support at 50 Percent;
State Avg. Valuation at $300,00/Pupil;
Local Levy Rate Limit at $5/1000.
State Aid
500
equalizing program is designed to distribute a set amount of
state aid dollars inversely to the school district's ability to
pay in terms of assessed valuation per pupil.
-A state aid ratio is calculated and typically equals one
minus the multiplication of a constant times a ratio of the
district's valuation per pupil'over the state average valuation
per pupil. The constant represents the desired statewide local
share of estimated state authorized per pupil costs (Figure 5).
For example, assume that the state desires that local
schools pay 50 percent of the estimated state authorized school
bill Mith SO percent to be picked up by the state. , If local
District A had SSOO^OOO valuation per pupil and the state ave^rage
valuation per pupil was $300,000, then the state aid ratio for
District A would be lr<-3(500,000/300,000)) or .1667 of the
estimated state authorized per pupil cost. If the state
authorized cost was $3000 per pupil and District A had 1,000
pupils, it would receive (.1667*3000*1000) or $500,100 in aid.
If local District B was the same size but had $100,000
valuation per pupil, then the state aid ratio would be 1"
(.5(100,000/300,000)) or .8333 of the estimated state authorized
per pupil cost. Here the state aid would be $2,^99,900.
The percentage equalizing option tends to result in, uniform
property tax levy rates across districts as long as expected
state authorized costs per pupil used to drive the formula are
similar to actual total costs per pupils However, if the actual
total costs per pupil are significantly higher than the state
authorized costs, then local leeway can be raised above .the s^ate
cost level. If this is done, the "poor" districts may be forced
18
to levy a higher property tax rate per *1,000 valuation than
would the "wealthy" districts in order to cover full costs.
Local expenditures per pupil may be used instead of state
authorized expenditures per pupils This open-ended variation of
percentage equalizing allows more local leeway- However- under
this approach, either the amount of state aid must be set
independent of the formula or the amount of state aid required by
the formula varies depending upon local district behavior• If
the latter is the case, then the state aid received by any one
district depends upon the behavior of the other districts.
Under declining enrollment, rising valuation per pupil leads
to increasing local leeway and local effort per pupil- However,
state aid per pupil declines and total expenditures per pupil
remain constant.
(6) Power Equalization Formulas- No state relies totally on
power equalization, except perhaps Hawaii which provides full
state funding for all education. Power equalization is a broad
concept that may be applied to a variety of formulas (Jones;
Gai-ms, Guthrie, and Pierce). It refers to equalizing the tax
paying abilities among school districts and does not refer to
equalization of expenditures per pupil. In some cases, power
equalization can involve recapture of revenues from wealthy
districts to distribute to the poor districts (Figure 6). ,
Under declining enrollment, expenditures per pupil remain
constant. State aid declines if it was formerly received.
Ability to spend local revenues locally will eventually declines
if the state recaptures the increase in local revenues per pupil.
19
Expend.
(thou $)
Variation in Scliool Spending
Across Districts, Option Vi:
Power Equalization
Per Pupil
600
Valuation / Pupil (thou $)
Own Levy State Aid . SI Recapture
Figure 6. Power Equalization at $3000
per Pupil; Local Required Levy Rate $10.
(7) & Combination ftpproach• Eight states employ a
combination of options in their respective state aid formulas
(School Finance at a Glance). For example, the power
equalization concep,t may be applied, to wealth or expenditure
guarantee (Figure 7) and the open ended percentage equalization
formulas previously discussed. In this particular case, the
impact of the power equalization is to equalize the ability to
raise revenues per pupil without mandating equalized expenditures
per pupil. This leaves more authority in the hands of local
officials.
In . addition^ many states use combination formulas by
separating school district expenditures according to function ..or
object in order to develop different rationale (and formulas) in
providing state aid for each type of expenditure. For example,
some states have taken special education, transportation, and/or
new building expenditures outside of the traditional equalization
formula and developed specific formulas ,for each function
depending upon the perceived state, local and parent-pupil
responeibility•
For example, some states view provisions for school building
as a local responsibility. In addition, there may be temporal
inequities caused by state aid programs that assist some
districts in.buiIding new buildings but penalize those districts
which previously built facilities prior to implementation of the
aid program. ^ Alternatively, all districts may be given school
building aid to be set aside in a fund until needed for use.
Those who believe that it' is the state's role to provide
equal access to a school, may prefer that the state provide aid
ei
Variation in School Spending
Across Districts, Option III
Plus Power Equalized Leeway
. . 6
Per Pupil
Expend.
(thou $)
Valuation' / Pupil '(thou '$)
Required ^
Levy
Figure 7. Req. Levy $5.40; Expenditure
Guarantee $3000; Levy Rate Limit $10;.,
Power Equalized Valuation at $6d0;000.
-.Found. Local
Leeway
600
Maximum
Power
Aid
to cover all (or a percentage 'matching share) of transportation
costs. If transportation is Included within the equalization
fprmulay geographically large districts may be penalized' because
a higher proportion of their budget per piipil must be devoted to
transportation compared to.smaller districts.
The perceived ' role of the state in ' providing access to
special education programs, may depend upon how such programs are
geographically; organized in the. state. ^Some states encourage
multi-district and/or special education sharing programs whereas
other states may not. Some.states may^view .special education as
a major responsibility of the local district. - However9 others
may view it as a major responsibility of the state to provide an
equal opportunity to achieve a minimum educational competency.
SUMMARY STATEMENT
In the final analysis^ the various school aid formula
options previously reviewed result in different consequences
related to uniformity in property tax levy rates and equalization
of per pupil expenditures. Some formulas achieve uniform levy
ratesp but create variation in per pupil expenditures across
districts. Other formulas achieve equalized per pupil
expenditures^ by creating variation in property tax levy rates
across districts. Still other formulas achieve uniform tax rates
and equalized expenditures per pupil. In the final analysis, the
school aid formula selected by the Legislative Assembly depends
upon the desired consequences.
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